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The decision of the Supreme Court of the U. S. in O'Neil v.
State of Vermont on April 4 th may not, as has been asserted,
reverse all decisions hitherto made on the subject of inter-State
commerce, nor may it indicate a backward step in the march of
federal control over the entire commercial system. But its dis-
mission of the case on the technical objection that no federal ques-
tion was presented does not make it less difficult to harmonize with
Zeisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. ioo. The facts were precisely analogous.
The effect of the decision precisely contrary. The case itself pre-
sents many unusual questions. It maintains the power of one State
to punish the citizen of another for a transaction legal and initiated
in the State of his residence but illegal in the State where con-
summated by an agent ; and it is further marked by a sharp differ-
ence of opinion as to when a federal question is so involved by the
record as to give the court jurisdiction. There is the same dif-
ference as to the application of the 8th Amendment of the Consti-
ttition of the U. S. O'Neil, the plaintiff in error, was a licensed
liquor dealer residing in Whitehall, N. Y. His patrons were res-
idents of Rutland, Vermont. They were supposed to live under a
stringent prohibitory law. An express company carrying the
"original package," C. 0. D., constituted the connecting link in
the transaction. As long as O'Neil gathered in the golden har-
vest at a respectful distance from the border line all went well.
But he ventured into Vermont, and was promptly seized and
brought to justice - of a sort - at Rutland, Vt. A justice of the
peace sentenced him to pay a fine of $9712.96, or an alternative
sentence of more than seventy-nine years -exceeding in severity
according to Mr. Justice Field, "anything which I have been
able to find in the records of. our Courts for the present century."
The County Court mercifully modified this sentence to something
like half a century. The Supreme court of Vermont affirmed the
decision. It declared that the sending of such a package from
Whitehall, N. Y., to Rutland, Vt., C. 0. D., was an executory
contract of sale in New York, but since the vendor did not part
with the title until the purchaser paid the express charges, such a
,contract of sale was consummated in Vermont. The seller was
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therefore constructively present and guilty under its prohibitory
law. It held, also, that a " cruel and unusual punishment,"
within the terms of the constitution of its State and the U. S.
meant only an inordinate punishment for a single infraction of the
law, not an accumulated punishment for repeated infractions
when the penalty for each was reasonable. The Supreme Court
of the U. S. by a majority of four to three, held that it had no juris-
diction, and said: "The only question considered by the Supreme
Court of Vermont in its opinion in regard to the present case was
whether the liquor in question was sold by O'Neil at Rutland or
at Whitehall, so as to fall within or without the statute of Vermont,
and the Court arrived at its conclusion that the completed sale was
in Vermont. That does not include any federal question. * * *
The Supreme Court of Vermont decided the case before us upon
a ground broad enough to maintain its judgment without consid-
ering any federal question. No federal question was presented
for its decision as to this case. Nor was the decision of a federal
question necessary to the determination of this case, nor was any
actually decided, nor does it appear that the judgment as rendered
could not have been given without deciding one." The justices
disagreed as to whether the record showed that the plaintiff in
error had specifically excepted in the court below on the ground
that the transactions were protected by the inter-State commerce
clause, or whether the Sup. Court of Vt. had or had not decided
that. question directly in its opinion. Mr. Justice Field, however,
with whom Justices Harlan and Brewer seem in the main to agree,
dissents on the broader ground that the jurisdiction of the court
depends on the substance and not the form of the record, saying :
" It is not necessary, to give this court jurisdiction to review the
judgment of that court, that the record should show that the
objection, that the transactions were those of interstate commerce,
was specifically taken in terms in the court below; it is sufficient
if the facts of the record show that the question of their being
transactions of that character was involved in the case, though the
court below may state in various forms that it did not deem it
necessary to consider it. In Mfurray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432,
441, it was held that whenever rights, acknowledged and pro-
tected by the Constitution of the United States, are denied or
invaded by State legislation, which is sustained by the judgment
of a State court, this court is authorized to interfere; that the
jurisdiction to re-examine such judgment cannot be defeated by
showing that the record does not in direct terms refer to a consti-
tutional provision, nor expressly state that a federal question was
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presented ; and that the true jurisdictional test is, whether it
appears that such a question was decided adversely to the federal
right.". Upon the question of "cruel and unusual punishment,"
the majority opinion says: "We forbear the consideration of this
question because as a federal question it is not assigned as error
nor even suggested in the brief of the plaintiff in error ; and so far
as it is a question arising under the constitution of Vermont, it is
not within our province ; moreover,, as a federal question, it has
always been ruled that the 8th Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States does not apply to the States." Mr. justice
Field speaking on this point for the three dissenting justices
declares that the operation of the 8th Amendment combined with
the i 4 th is to protect every citizen of the U. S. from such punish-
ment. His opinion on this point is so interesting that it is given
at large: "I go farther than the consideration of the question of
inter-State commerce involved. Having jurisdiction of the case on
the ground stated, I think we may look into its whole record. * *
* And if it appears from the proceedings taken and the rulings
made in the court below, on questions brought to its notice, that
the rights of the accused, affecting his liberty or his life, have
been invaded, this court may exercise its jurisdiction for the cor-
rection of errors committed. The 14 th Amendment declares that
no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, and that
no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law. I agree, as held in Zn re Rahrer, 140 U.
S. 555, that those inhibitions do not invest Congress with any
power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of
State legislation. They only operate as restraints upon State
action, like the prohibitions upon legislation by the States impair-
ing the obligation of contracts, or to pass a bill of attainder or an
ex post facto law. But in all cases touching life or liberty I deem
it the duty of this court, when once it has jurisdiction of a case,
to enforce these restraints for the protection of the citizen where
they have been disregarded in the court below, though called to
its attention. I do not pretend that this court should take up
questions not arising upon the record, but I do contend that it is
competent for the court when once it has acquired jurisdiction of
a case to see that the life or liberty of the citizen is not wantonly
sacrificed because of some imperfect statement of the party's
right. * * * In opening the record in this case, we not
only see that the exclusive power of Congress to regulate com-
merce was invaded, but we see that a cruel as well as an unusual
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punishment was inflicted upon the accused, and that the objection
was taken in the court below, and immunity therefrom was spe-
dally claimed. The 8th Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States, relating to punishments of this kind, was formerly
held to be directed only against the authorities of the United
States, and as not applicable to the States. (Barron v. Baltimore,
7 Peters 243.) Such was undoubtedly the case previous to the
14 th Amendment, and such must be its limitation now, unless
exemption from such punishment is one of the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States, which can be enforced
under the clause declaring that 'no State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge' those privileges or immunities. In
Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. 36, it was held that the inhibition
of that amendment was against abridging the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States as distinguished from priv-
ileges and immunities of citizens of the States. Assuming such
to be the case, the question arises: ' What are the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States which are thus pro-
tected?' These terms are not idle words to be treated as mean-
ingless, and the inhibition of their abridgment as ineffectual for
any purpose, as some would seem to think. They are of momen-
tous import, and the inhibition is a great guaranty to the citizens
of the United States of those privileges and immunities against
any possible State invasion. It may be difficult to define the
terms so as to cover all the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States, but after much reflection I think the defini-
tion given at one time before this court by a distinguished advo-
cate-lMr. John Randolph Tucker, of Virginia,-is correct, that
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are
such as have their recognition in or guaranty from the Constitu-
tion of the United States. * * * The rights thus recog-
nized and declared are rights of citizens of the United States
under their Constitution which could not be violated by federal
authority. For when the late civil war closed, and slavery was
abolished by the i 3 th Amendment, there was a legislation in the
former slave-holding States inconsistent with these rights, and a
general apprehension arose in a portion of the country -whether
justified or not is immaterial -that this legislation would still be
enforced and the rights of the freedmen would not be respected.
The i4 th Amendment followed, which declares that ' all persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.' The freedmen thus became citizens of the
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United States and entitled in the future to all the privileges and
immunities of such citizens. But owing to previous legislation
many of those privileges and immunities, if that legislation was
allowed to stand, would be abridged; therefore, in the same
amendment by which they were made citizens, it is ordained that
' no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States,' thus
nullifying existing legislation of that character, and prohibiting its
enactment in the future. While, therefore, the ten amendments,
as limitations on power, and, so far as they accomplish their pur-
pose and find their fruition in such limitations, are applicable
only to the federal government and not to the States, yet, so far
as they declare or recognize the rights of persons, they are rights
belonging to them as citizens of the United States under the Con-
stitution ; and the 14 th Amendment, as to all such rights, places
a limit upon State power by ordaining that no State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge them. If I am right in this
view, then every citizen of the United States is protected from
punishments which are cruel and unusual. It is an immunity
which belongs to him, against both State and federal action."
An interesting and important question in constitutional gov-
ernment was considered by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in
Alfiller v. Johnson, 18 S. W. Rep. 522. The Kentucky constitution
of 1849 provided for the calling of a convention by the legislature
for the purpose of making constitutional amendments, but con-
tained no provision as to the submission of the work of the con-
vention to the people. In 189o the legislature called a conven-
tion, and enacted that the draft of a constitution adopted by the
convention should not be operative until ratified by a majority of
the voters of the State. The convention submitted a draft of a
constitution to the voters, who ratified it by a large majority.
Afterwards the convention made numerous changes in the instru-
ment which the people had ratified, some of which changes it was
claimed were material, and promulgated the amended instrument
as the constitution of the State. The. court held that this instru-
ment was a valid constitution, on the broad ground that it had
been recognized as such by the executive and legislative depart-
ments of the government. HOLT, C. J., said : "Great interests
have already arisen under it; important rights exist by virtue of
it ; persons have been convicted of the highest crimes known to
the law, according to its provisions; the political power of the
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government has in many ways recognized it; and, under such
circumstances it is our duty to treat and regard it as a valid consti-
tution, and now the organic law of our commonwealth. We need
not consider the validity of the amendments made after the con-
vention reassembled. If the making of them was in excess of its
power, yet, as the entire instrument has been recognized as valid
in the manner suggested, it would be equally an abuse of power
by the judiciary, and violative of the rights of the people,-who
can and properly should remedy the matter, if not to their liking
-if it were to declare the instrument or a portion invalid, and
bring confusion and anarchy upon the State." BENNETT, J., dis-
senting, said that, "the constitution being silent upon the subject
of submission, the power of the legislature, as the people's agent,
is supreme upon that subject; and they had a perfect right to
provide, as they did, that the convention must submit their work
to the people for ratification or" rejection, or they might have pro-
vided that they should have the absolute power upon that subject.
* * * It follows from what I have said that all material
changes made by the convention after it reassembled in September
are void." The merit of this decision is certainly not free from
doubt, and its importance is evident; because, if the court had
decided that it was not bound by the decision of the political
departments of the government, the reasons of the dissenting
judge in favor of the invalidity of the new constitution, would
seem to be logical and controlling.
The Supreme Court of the United States has decided in two
recent cases, Lx pate Rapier, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 374, and Horner
v. United States et at., 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 407, that the Act of Con-
gress, September, 189o, excluding lottery matter from the mails
is constitutional. The court also held that the freedom of the
press and the right of free communication were in no way abridged,
within the intent and meaning of the constitutional provision.
In the recent case of Chandler v. Pomeroy et al., 12 Sup. Rep.
410, the Supreme Court of the United States, reversing same
case, 46 Fed. Rep. 533, held that where the son and two daughters
of a testator contracted to disregard the will and divide the
property equally among them, the contract in the absence of
fraud should be specifically performed.
